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PRUDENTIALISM IN MCDONALD
V. CITY OF CHICAGO
NEIL S. SIEGEL*

Justice Stevens’[s] final reason for rejecting incorporation of the
Second Amendment reveals, more clearly than any of the others,
the game that is afoot. Assuming that there is a “plausible
constitutional basis” for holding that the right to keep and bear
arms is incorporated, he asserts that we ought not to do so for
1
prudential reasons.

Prudential considerations have long been understood to influence
Supreme Court decisionmaking. At least two kinds of prudential
arguments have been identified in the literature on constitutional
interpretation. The first, broader form of prudentialism inquires into
the overall consequences for the constitutional system, whether good
2
or bad, of deciding a constitutional question in a particular way. One
might call this variant system-centered prudentialism. The second,
narrower type inquires into the consequences of having the federal
courts, as opposed to some other institution, decide the issue in a
3
particular way. One might call this category court-centered
prudentialism.

* Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke Law School. I thank the editors of the
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy for inviting me to comment on the
McDonald decision and for lending me their fine editorial hands. For illuminating suggestions, I
am grateful to Joseph Blocher, Guy Charles, Erwin Chemerinsky, Barry Friedman, Craig
Green, Robert Post, Richard Primus, and Ernie Young. I am indebted to Bryan Leitch for
outstanding research assistance. I dedicate this essay to my father, Steven Siegel, an expert
practitioner of prudentialism and passionate defender of the right to bear arms.
1. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3056 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR, &
REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 55 (5th ed. 2006); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 61 (1982) (“Prudential argument is constitutional argument which is actuated by
the political and economic circumstances surrounding the decision.”).
3. See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 2, at 55.
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System-centered prudentialism endeavors to register an all-thingsconsidered judgment about the relative costs and benefits of
alternative resolutions of a constitutional question. Court-centered
prudentialism focuses more specifically on the way in which the
federal judiciary responds to a controversy. For example, courtcentered prudentialism may inform whether the Justices decide a case
or decline to decide, whether they decide the merits or decide on
procedural grounds, or whether they decide the merits relatively
broadly or narrowly.
Commentators often characterize court-centered prudentialism as
motivated by anxiety over the Supreme Court’s preservation of its
own public legitimacy, which can be undermined when the Justices
4
decide divisive issues in ways that cause backlash. In my own work,
for example, I have stressed the importance of the virtue of judicial
statesmanship. Judicial statesmanship, among other things, counsels
the Justices to perceive and vindicate the preconditions of the public
5
legitimation of the constitutional law that they craft. By contrast,
system-centered prudentialism asks not only what judicial response is
best for the Court’s present and future effectiveness, but also what
resolution is best for the constitutional system as a whole when the
6
Court’s own legitimacy is not threatened.

4. See, e.g., id. (“[Judges] may be concerned that taking up a controversial question, or
offering a broad or ambitious reading of the Constitution, even if correct, will provoke a
backlash from the other branches of government or from the public generally.”). For a classic
display of court-centered prudentialism, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
5. See generally Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959
(2008).
6. Court-centered prudentialism is a subset of system-centered prudentialism because
judgments about what is best for the Court properly inform judgments about what is best for the
constitutional system as a whole. This may be why scholars do not always distinguish the two
forms of prudentialism. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The
Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early
Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 401 (2005) (“[T]he rules of avoidance, putatively about
judicial restraint and deference to political institutions, allowed the Court to play a game of
high-stakes politics, to correct individual injustice in some circumstances, and to protect its
independence and future autonomy.”); BREST ET AL., supra note 2, at 55 (noting the possibility
of prudential objections to judicial decisions that “in the long run will have worse consequences
for the constitutional system than if courts had avoided taking up the issue directly for the
moment, deferred to the political branches, or offered a narrow or limited ruling”). I offer the
distinction between court-centered and system-centered prudentialism because I want to
explore situations in which Justices reason prudentially but are unconcerned about the Court’s
institutional position.
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The Court’s recent decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago
illustrates the practice of system-centered prudentialism. Judging
from the concerns raised by several Justices at oral argument,
especially Justice Scalia, members of the McDonald plurality
appeared to reason prudentially in deciding to use Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—and not its Privileges
or Immunities Clause—to apply the Second Amendment to state and
8
local governments. The Court reasoned prudentially in substantial
part because it was troubled about the consequences for the
American constitutional system of opening up a Pandora’s Box of
new assertions of unenumerated rights, not because its own legitimacy
was in any way at stake.
Part I describes relevant portions of the oral argument and
opinions in McDonald. Part II identifies system-centered
prudentialism in McDonald, contrasting the several prudential
concerns laid bare at oral argument with the absence of a key
prudential consideration in Justice Alito’s plurality opinion and
Justice Scalia’s concurrence. Part III suggests that McDonald
illustrates both the importance of understanding why judges may
decline to acknowledge their own practice of prudentialism, and the
need for constitutional theory to accommodate prudential argument.
I.

THE ARGUMENT AND DECISION IN MCDONALD

In McDonald, litigants on the same side of the case confronted the
Court with alternative routes to the conclusion that the Second
Amendment, as interpreted by the Court in District of Columbia v.
9
Heller, regulates state and local governments. Alan Gura, counsel for
the petitioners in both McDonald and Heller, enthusiastically invited
10
the Court to overrule the Slaughter-House Cases and bring back to
life the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
11
Amendment. In stark contrast, former Solicitor General Paul
Clement, representing the National Rifle Association in support of
the petitioners, urged the Court to rely on the Due Process Clause of

7. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010) (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter “Tr.”].
9. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
10. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
11. See Brief for Petitioners at 42, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

11/1/2010 12:20:58 PM

PRUDENTIALISM IN MCDONALD

19

12

the Fourteenth Amendment. This has been the orthodox path
traveled by the Court when holding that particular provisions of the
13
Bill of Rights bind the states.
At oral argument, it immediately became evident that the Court
was unenthusiastic about bringing the Privileges or Immunities
14
Clause back to life. Indeed, the Court was as enthusiastic about that
project as Gene Wilder was interested in bringing the dead back to
15
life at the beginning of the movie Young Frankenstein. Chief Justice
Roberts advised Gura that he had to carry “a heavy burden” in order
to persuade the Court to overrule a decision that has been the law for
16
140 years. Justice Sotomayor wanted to know “[w]hat injustice has
17
been caused by [Slaughter-House] that we have to remedy?” Justice
Ginsburg skeptically inquired, “[w]hat unenumerated rights would we
18
be declaring privileges and immunities under your conception of it?”
Most illuminating were Justice Scalia’s questions and comments
from the bench. “I’m not talking about whether . . . the Slaughter-

12. See Brief for Respondents the National Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 22, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521); Reply Brief for Respondents
the National Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., et al. in Support of Petitioners at 9, McDonald, 130 S. Ct.
3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). Paul Clement’s name appears only on the NRA’s reply brief, but he
argued the case in the Supreme Court on behalf of the organization.
13. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968) (summarizing the provisions
of the Bill of Rights that the Court has held are incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
14. It might be objected that the Privileges or Immunities Clause lives in light of Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). The Saenz Court held that one facet of the fundamental right to travel
is the right of new residents of a state to be treated the same as longer term residents, and that
this facet of the right is protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at 502–03. So far,
however, Saenz has not had generative force beyond the context of the right to travel, which the
Court has long deemed protected apart from the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969).
15. See Gene Wilder, Young Frankenstein (1974), screenplay at http://www.horrorlair.com/
scripts/young.txt. In his role as Dr. Frankenstein, Wilder exhausted (and wounded) himself
trying to disabuse a young medical student who persisted in inquiring about the re-animation of
dead tissue:
[O]nce the human organism has ceased to function, nature has deemed that creature
to be dead. . . . You have more chance of re-animating this knife than you have of
mending a broken nervous system . . . . My grandfather’s work was Doo-Doo! Dead is
Dead! There’s only one thing I am interested in . . . and that is the preservation of
LIFE!
As it turned out, Dr. Frankenstein protested too much. Time will tell whether the same can be
said of the McDonald Court’s relationship to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
16. Tr., supra note 8, at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 5.
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House Cases were right or wrong,” he insisted. Rather, if using the
Privileges or Immunities Clause does not “make it any easier to get
the Second Amendment adopted with respect to the States,” why,
Scalia asked with exasperation, did Gura want the Court “to overrule
. . . 140 years of prior law—when you can reach your result under
substantive due [process]— . . . unless you’re bucking for . . . a place on
20
some law school faculty.” Not content with one slap at the legal
academy(!), Scalia added that “what you argue is the darling of the
professoriate, for sure, but it’s also contrary to 140 years of our
jurisprudence. Why do you want to undertake that burden instead of
just arguing substantive due process? Which, as much as I think it’s
21
wrong . . . —even I have acquiesced in it.”
During Gura’s rebuttal, Justice Kennedy asked him to identify
“what privileges and immunities are now being denied citizens of the .
22
. . the United States.” When Gura responded that he “can’t give a full
description of all unenumerated rights that are going to be
23
protected,” Justice Scalia revealingly wanted to know why his
24
inability to provide such an account “doesn’t trouble you.” By stark
contrast, Paul Clement’s characteristically masterful argument gave
most of the Justices in the Heller majority just what they seemed to
want: a full-throated defense of using the Due Process Clause as the
25
vehicle to incorporate the Second Amendment.
Like the statements from the bench during oral argument, Justice
Alito’s plurality opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurrence snuffed out
the privileges or immunities argument with dispatch. Unlike oral
argument, however, their explanations were less robust. In an opinion
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
Justice Alito initially observed that “petitioners are unable to identify
the Clause’s full scope, . . . [n]or is there any consensus on that
question among the scholars who agree that the Slaughter-House
26
Cases’ interpretation is flawed.” As for the reason why the plurality
was rejecting the privileges or immunities argument, however, he

19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 6–7.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 62.
23. Id. at 63–64.
24. Id. at 64.
25. See id. at 18 (“Under this [C]ourt’s existing jurisprudence, the case for incorporating
the Second Amendment through the Due Process Clause is remarkably straightforward.”).
26. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030.
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stated only that the Court need not reconsider Slaughter-House
because “[f]or many decades, the question of the rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been
analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not
27
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia echoed his assertion at oral
argument that McDonald did not require him to reconsider his
acquiescence in substantive due process, despite his serious misgivings
about it as an original matter. Reconsideration was unnecessary,
according to Justice Scalia, “because [substantive due process] is both
28
long established and narrowly limited,”
and because
“straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide” the
29
case. Unlike his statement at oral argument, Justice Scalia did not
30
mention being “trouble[d]” by counsel’s inability to identify all of
the unenumerated rights that a rehabilitated Privileges or Immunities
Clause would protect.
Only Justice Thomas accepted the privileges or immunities
31
argument. He thoughtfully disputed Justice Stevens’s suggestion that
a revitalized Privileges or Immunities Clause would increase judicial
32
discretion relative to the doctrinal status quo.
II. SYSTEM-CENTERED PRUDENTIALISM IN MCDONALD
As noted above, the plurality opinion offered a cursory
explanation of why it was relying on the Due Process Clause instead
33
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. After referencing in passing
the uncertain scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice
27. Id. at 3030–31.
28. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id.
30. Tr., supra note 8, at 64.
31. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
32. Id. at 3086. Notably, Justice Thomas’s opinion is suffused with prudentialist
reassurances that his preferred resolution of the case would not destabilize the legal system. See
id. at 3063 (“The question presented in this case is not whether our entire Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised, but only whether, and to what extent,
a particular clause in the Constitution protects the particular right at issue here.”); id. at 3084 (“I
do not endeavor to decide in this case whether, or to what extent, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause applies any other rights enumerated in the Constitution against the States . . . . I consider
stare decisis only as it applies to the question presented here.”); id. at 3086 (“Because this case
does not involve an unenumerated right, it is not necessary to resolve the question whether the
Clause protects such rights, or whether the Court’s judgment in Slaughter-House was correct.”).
33. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Alito).
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Alito invoked stare decisis as the reason for using the Due Process
34
Clause. But viewing McDonald as a case involving just a
straightforward application of precedent risks overlooking the
“prudential and pragmatic considerations” that infuse the Court’s
35
determination of whether to abide by precedent. For example, the
Heller Court did away with a militia-based reading of the Second
Amendment that had been on the books longer than the Court’s
incorporation doctrine, and the Court overrules precedent, whether
36
implicitly or explicitly, with some regularity in constitutional cases. A
prudential, discretionary judgment must explain why the McDonald
plurality respected precedent in McDonald but not in Heller. The fact
that the Court’s own practice of stare decisis is a form of
prudentialism should give pause to those who, like Justice Scalia in
the quotation that opens this essay, use the term “prudential” to
identify constitutional decisions that are based on non-constitutional
37
and illegitimate concerns.
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s full explanation at oral argument for
sticking with the Due Process Clause suggests the presence of
prudential reasoning that is distinguishable from the prudential
considerations that are conventionally understood in terms of stare
decisis. He was in essence suggesting this: because the end result in
McDonald would be the same, the Court should continue to enforce

34. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31.
35. “[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding,” the Casey Court wrote, “its judgment
is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations . . . .” Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citations omitted). Specifically:
[W]e may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the
old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.
Id. at 854–55 (citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to
Miranda V. Arizona), -- GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1647745.
37. In contrast to Justice Scalia’s usage, the Court’s “prudential” standing doctrine is
explicitly based on non-constitutional but legitimate concerns. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“[T]he question of standing . . . involves both constitutional limitations on
federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions it is
founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic
society.”) (citation omitted).
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the deeply incorrect understanding of one clause of the Constitution
(due process), rather than enforce the correct understanding of
another clause of the Constitution (privileges or immunities). It
seemed of little consequence that the latter clause had effectively
been excised from the Constitution by a judicial decision that almost
no one today of any ideological or methodological persuasion is
38
prepared to defend as even arguably correct. Textualist and
originalist arguments, no matter how strong, do not appear to meet
the “burden” of overcoming Justice Scalia’s “acquiesce[nce]” in
substantive due process so long as “straightforward application of
39
settled doctrine” gets the Court where he believes it should go.
Significantly, Justice Scalia did not suggest that the Court should
take this path because he is committed to a strong form of stare
decisis in constitutional cases; like the rest of the McDonald plurality
and Heller majority, he is not strongly committed to stare decisis in
40
constitutional adjudication. Rather, he seemed to be standing on the
shoulders of some distinguished jurists before him, including Judge
Wilkinson, who have warily regarded the Privileges or Immunities
41
Clause as “something like a dormant volcano.” That is, Justice Scalia

38. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV.
601, 631 n.178 (2001) (noting that “[t]he Slaughter-House Cases . . . on the most straightforward
and conventional reading[,] virtually read the [Privileges or Immunities Clause]—the central
clause of Section 1!—out of the Amendment[,]” and that “[v]irtually no serious modern
scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that this is a plausible reading of the Amendment”);
Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3,
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521):
Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause and limiting Slaughter-House and its
progeny would bring this Court’s jurisprudence in line with constitutional text and a
near-unanimous scholarly consensus on the history and meaning of the Clause.
Slaughter-House read the Privileges or Immunities Clause so narrowly as to essentially
read it out of the Amendment . . . .
39. See supra notes 21, 29 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia). Given his belief
that the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence is indefensible as an original matter, it is
not clear why Justice Scalia believes as an original matter that the Constitution requires
incorporation of the Second Amendment.
40. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586–87 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do
not myself believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis in constitutional cases . . . .”).
41. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause,
12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 51 (1989). Judge Wilkinson vividly voiced prudential concerns
about using the Privileges or Immunities Clause:
The danger in this expansive interpretation . . . is the often-made observation that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause may be something like a dormant volcano. For well
over a hundred years the clause has remained in the background of the constitutional
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seemed moved by concern for the proper functioning of the
constitutional system. Reading between the lines of his utterance near
42
the end of oral argument, he appeared “trouble[d]” by the legal
uncertainty, incentives for new assertions of unenumerated rights, and
opportunities for judicial creativity that overruling Slaughter-House
43
would likely usher into existence. Justice Scalia presumably had in
mind the liberals and conservatives (whether law professors, political
activists, or federal judges) who disagree about much but who agree
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should be put back to work.
For example, an impressive and ideologically diverse group of legal
academics argued in an amicus brief that “the textually and
historically accurate way to determine if the states must respect an
individual right to keep and bear arms is to examine the meaning of
44
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
I rely on Justice Scalia’s statements from the bench because he is
not one to play devil’s advocate or to keep his concerns to himself
when he cares deeply about an issue. He seemed to be endorsing the
City of Chicago’s argument in its merits brief that “[o]verruling
Slaughter-House and its progeny would create a chaotic situation in

landscape. A dormant volcano may not be very exciting, but once it erupts the
excitement may prove a bit much. Its course of eruption would be both difficult to
predict and to contain. Neither the language of the clause nor any judicial
interpretations provide useful guidance in determining what rights would be
fundamental. The clause would become a font for new federal common law. This was
Justice Frankfurter’s concern when he warned against the “mischievous uses to which
that clause would lend itself” if it escaped the bounds set by the Slaughter-House
majority.
Id. (quoting Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61–62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see
id. at 52 (“For the very reason that it has so long remained a clean slate, a revitalized Privileges
or Immunities Clause holds special hazards for judges who are mindful that their proper task is
not to write their personal views of appropriate public policy into the Constitution.”); id.
(“[T]here is much to be said for continuing the present predictability of ‘privileges or
immunities’ jurisprudence, and not engaging in a disruptive roll of the dice.”).
42. Tr., supra note 8, at 64.
43. I surmise that Justice Scalia was concerned about new assertions of unenumerated
rights in particular, and not just about legal uncertainty in general, in light of the uncertainty
caused by McDonald and District of Columbia v. Heller. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3115
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s decision invites an avalanche of litigation that could mire
the federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state and local regulations
comport with the Heller right—the precise contours of which are far from pellucid—under a
standard of review we have not even established.”).
44. Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–
3, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). The academics who signed this brief were
Richard Aynes, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, Steven Calabresi, Michael Kent Curtis, Michael
Lawrence, William Van Alstyne, and Adam Winkler.
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constitutional law . . . . [P]etitioners’ argument would require this
Court to sort out which unenumerated and previously unrecognized
45
rights are protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.” Justice
Scalia, as well as the rest of the plurality, also may have been
concerned about future pressure to incorporate enumerated rights;
the Court has long held that the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury
Clause and the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury requirement do not
apply to the States via the Due Process Clause. Justice Alito thus
wrote that “[u]nder our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is
fundamental from an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis
46
counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States.”
In Heller, Justice Scalia declared that “it is not the role of this
47
Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct” despite more
than a century of precedent to the contrary. In McDonald, by contrast,
he appeared to believe that it is the role of the Court not to disturb
the near extinction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause when
applying the best textualist and originalist reading of the Clause holds
the potential for mischief. Prudentialism seems present even in the
reasoning of a jurist who self-identifies as an originalist, who insists
48
that “the soul of the law . . . is logic and reason,” and who, in the very
case sub judice, denounced Justice Stevens’s own practice of
49
prudentialism as “incapable of restraining judicial whimsy.”
III. REALISM ABOUT PRUDENTIALISM
For those who assert a sharp distinction between constitutional
law and constitutional politics, court-centered prudentialism may be
easier to justify, or at least to excuse, than the system-centered
prudentialism on display in McDonald. After all, even if one believes
that constitutional decisions characteristically should be entirely

45. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park at 47, 50, McDonald,
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 5190478.
46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)
(citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment); Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co.
v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (civil jury)).
47. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008).
48. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 633 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 618 (“If this Court is to decide cases by rule of law
rather than show of hands, we must surrender to logic and choose sides.”).
49. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3052 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also supra note 1 and
accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia’s criticism of Justice Stevens’s prudentialism).
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50

“principled,” one might not be enthusiastic about a Court that walks
51
itself off a cliff—as it came close to accomplishing in 1937, and as
Justice Scalia himself wisely took pains to avoid having the Court do
52
in Heller. At least one should not be enthusiastic about a Court that
always follows principles out to their logical conclusions if one values
53
the institution of judicial review.
System-centered prudentialism, by contrast, is no mere pragmatic
exception to principle that is justifiable or excusable on grounds of
institutional survival. Such prudentialism can be defended only with a
persuasive account of why it is part of the judicial role to exercise
discretion in ways that promote the stability and health of the
54
American constitutional order. From a system-centered prudential
perspective, the Court is, in part, the head of a branch of government,
and an important part of what branches of government do is govern.
From this vantage point, there is much to admire in the McDonald

50. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it
must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”).
51. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 4, at 45 (“Serving this value [of laissez faire] in the most
uncompromising fashion, at a time when it was well past its heyday, five Justices, in a series of
spectacular cases in the 1920s and 1930s, went to unprecedented lengths to thwart the majority
will. The consequence was very nearly the end of the story.”).
52. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope
of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.
The McDonald plurality repeated this list of “don’t worries.” See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
In this and in other ways, Justice Scalia is more of a prudentialist than he typically presents
himself to be, whether in McDonald or elsewhere. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S.
913, 920 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.) (“To expect judges to take account of political
consequences—and to assess the high or low degree of them—is to ask judges to do precisely
what they should not do.”).
53. See Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics
and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 602 (1963) (“Standards or principles have a
certain ‘damn the torpedoes’ quality. . . . Standing on principle, in international, barroom, or
legislative-judicial relations is likely to lead to a fight.”).
54. For preliminary attempts at such an account, see generally Robert Post, Theorizing
Disagreement: Re-conceiving the Relationship Between Law and Politics, 98 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010); Siegel, supra note 5; Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of
Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473 (2007).
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plurality’s willingness to consider the possible consequences of clause
shifting in incorporating the Second Amendment, even if reasonable
minds can differ about the wisdom of the prudential judgment that
the plurality ultimately made. The key normative question is whether
and when such a governance function for the Court is compatible
with its legal obligation to uphold the rule of law.
This question may be related to another one that McDonald
illustrates well: why do judges who practice prudentialism often
decline to acknowledge that they are doing so, or affirmatively deny
55
that they are doing so, or criticize others for doing so? The issue
warrants careful exploration, as there are several possible
explanations besides the obvious candidates of self-delusion and
56
willful blindness. Such judges may recognize the importance of
prudentialism but may be unable to defend it as a proper
consideration because they do not perceive a way to reconcile it with
57
their responsibility to sustain rule-of-law values. In a given case, it
may turn out that there are in fact ways to reconcile the pursuit of
58
consequentialist objectives with fidelity to professional legal reason.
Or the case may be one in which the pursuit of instrumental goals
59
affirmatively contradicts the dictates of professional reason.
Alternatively, perhaps judges who deny their own practice of
prudentialism regard such prudentialism—and the discretion it
entails—as a proper but unspeakable consideration. They may regard
it as unspeakable for at least two reasons: one predominantly systemcentered and the other primarily court-centered. First, they may fear
that the very articulation of consequentialist reasoning may reduce
the likelihood that the reasoning will prove sound. Second, they may
fear that the truth of law’s own application conflicts at times with the
preconditions of its public legitimation.

55. Cf. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In a vibrant democracy,
usurpation should have to be accomplished in the dark.”).
56. Cf., e.g., BICKEL, supra note 4, at 74 (“Judges and lawyers recurrently come to feel that
they find law rather than make it. Many otherwise painful problems seem to solve themselves
with ease when this feeling envelops people.”).
57. For a discussion of rule-of-law values, see, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a
Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015–
16 (2005).
58. For a discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 54, at 1497–1503 (examining “weak”
dilemmas).
59. For a discussion, see id. at 1503–11 (examining “strong” dilemmas).
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Regarding the first possibility, an example may be the Court’s
unspoken “antibalkinization” rationale in the area of affirmative
action in higher education, which constitutionally favors those
admissions programs that mask their use of racial criteria. According
to the antibalkinization rationale, programs with essentially the same
net operative results may differentially affect preexisting beliefs about
racial issues because they differ in the explicitness of their use of
60
race. So, for example, a program that uses race as a “plus” factor is
deemed less suspect by the Court than a set-aside program or a
61
program that awards a set number of points based on race. Justices
Powell and O’Connor may have concluded that articulating the
antibalkinization rationale—and thereby declaring publicly that the
net operative results of these programs are largely the same—would
have undermined the objective of the rationale, which is to reduce
62
social tension over affirmative action.
Regarding the second possibility, judges who practice
prudentialism may feel the need to make a virtue of opacity when
they perceive an antinomy between the actual sources of the law they
are fashioning and the conditions of its legitimacy in the eyes of the
public. Martin Shapiro gave powerful voice to this perspective when
he wrote years ago that “[t]he distinction between what the Court
says to the public about what it is doing and what scholars say to one
63
another about what it is doing must be held firmly in mind.”
According to Shapiro, “[i]t would be fantastic indeed if the Supreme
Court in the name of sound scholarship were to publicly disavow the
64
myth upon which its power rests.” The concern here is that the
legitimacy of the legal system depends substantially (or, in some
versions of the argument, exclusively) on the popular belief that
judges decide cases impartially based upon preexisting law that is
fully autonomous of politics. As Robert Post has observed, “viewing
law as completely divorced from politics . . . is deeply ingrained and
pervasively regarded as a necessary foundation for the maintenance

60. See generally Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization,
Integration, Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 790–793 (2006).
61. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
62. For a discussion, see Post & Siegel, supra note 54, at 1488–97, 1503–06.
63. Shapiro, supra note 53, at 601.
64. Id.; see also id. at 603 (“If the Court is to be successful as a political actor, it must have
the authority and public acceptance which the principled, reasoned opinion brings.”).
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65

of judicial independence.” This popular belief explains the political
success of Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that “[j]udges are like
66
umpires” during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing,
notwithstanding the intellectual vulnerabilities of analogizing a
67
Supreme Court Justice to a baseball umpire.
It follows from this account of legal legitimacy that prudential
reasoning, which is prospective in outlook and requires the exercise of
discretion and judgment, over time will disillusion members of the
public, who will construe such reasoning as evidencing the assertion of
68
merely political power. The fear that the public perception of
prudentialism will tend to undermine legal legitimacy may help to
explain why dissenters seem more comfortable voicing prudential
concerns than Justices in the majority, particularly when the Court is
invalidating democratic action. The contrast between the approaches
69
of Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens in McDonald comes to mind.
Justice Scalia devoted his opinion to criticizing Justice Stevens’s
70
approach to substantive due process for licensing judicial discretion.
Justice Stevens, however, did not fully deny the charge. The Stevens
65. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 110 (2003); see e.g., id. (“It is no
accident that the Court characteristically appeals to this image of the law-politics distinction
whenever it feels called upon explicitly to defend its legal authority.”); Paul J. Mishkin, The
Supreme Court, 1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62 (1965) (footnotes omitted) (“Despite (and perhaps also
because of) its shortcomings as a description of reality, the ‘declaratory theory’ [associated with
Blackstone] expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial process on which much of courts’
prestige and power depend. This is the strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges are bound
by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they apply that law impersonally as well as impartially,
that they exercise no individual choice and have no program of their own to advance.”).
66. Statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States,
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (testimony of Judge John G.
Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.”). During her Supreme Court
confirmation hearing, Justice Sotomayor made a similar statement. See Sotomayor Pledges
“Fidelity to the Law,” CNNPOLITICS.COM,http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/13/
sotomayor.hearing/index.html?iref=hpmostpop (last updated July 13, 2009) (“In the past month,
many senators have asked me about my judicial philosophy . . . . It is simple: fidelity to the law.
The task of a judge is not to make law, it is to apply the law.”).
67. For a critique, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and
Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007).
68. For a discussion of this view of legal legitimacy, see Post & Siegel, supra note 54, at
1506–1508.
69. So does the contrast between the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See, e.g., id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no reason to
hope that the Court’s qualification of rational basis review will be any more successful than the
efforts at substantive economic review made by our predecessors as the century began.”).
70. Supra notes 1, 4949, and accompanying text.
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opinion constitutes a rare attempt by a judge, writing in his official
capacity, to come to terms with the fact of judicial discretion from the
internal perspective of the faithful practitioner of the law. “[T]o
acknowledge that the task of construing the liberty clause requires
judgment is not to say that it is a license for unbridled judicial
lawmaking,” he wrote. “To the contrary, only an honest reckoning with
our discretion allows for honest argumentation and meaningful
71
accountability.”
Under either account of unspeakability sketched above, the very
jurists who exercise discretion—who employ the distinctly human
faculty of judgment—may conclude that the constitutional system in
which they operate, or the courts on which they sit, are best served if
they deny this fact. Regardless of whether such concerns about the
72
consequences of judicial candor are well founded, they should not be
confused with the truth of the matter. I suspect, although I cannot
demonstrate here, that the kind of prudentialism on display in
McDonald is common. For example, system-centered prudentialism
almost certainly will influence the Court’s future determination of the
level of scrutiny that judges will apply in Second Amendment cases.
The stakes are too high, and the Justices are too sensible, for it to be
otherwise. If I am right, there may be a lesson here. The lesson may be
that we still require “[t]heory that can face fact,” as Llewellyn bluntly
73
put the point in 1934. “We must,” Cardozo instructed in 1921, “seek a
74
conception of law which realism can accept as true.” A realistic
appreciation of the presence of prudentialism in judicial practice does
not itself qualify as a persuasive conception of law. But neither can
realism accept as true a conception of law that always equates such
prudentialism with lawlessness.

71. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3103 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. For an argument that these concerns are real but often overstated, see generally Post &
Siegel, supra note 54.
73. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (1934).
74. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 127 (1921).

